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Abstract
Mathematical modelling is popular in cognitive psychology because it enables clear and formal descriptions of the processes at play; 
yet, this approach has rarely been applied to political psychology. Here we adopt mathematical modelling to develop a theory of 
political motivation, which is a central concept in political psychology. The theory assumes that, in certain contexts, individuals 
entertain a set of representations of society, for example of the past, present and future (but also of fictive societies such as utopias). 
To each representation of society, an incentive value is attached which is not absolute, but (following theories of motivation in 
cognitive psychology) reference-dependent; namely, dependent on the context, corresponding to the whole set of representations of 
society. In turn, the model proposes that these subjective values determine two central aspects: a motivation for performing an 
appropriate political action and the ensuing political mood. We discuss the model with respect to theoretical and empirical research 
(and we examine Marx and Engel’s communist manifesto as an example of the latter). In short, we offer a new mathematical 
perspective on political motivation which emphasises the role of multiple representations of society in determining political 
motivation and the ensuing political mood.
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In political psychology, a fundamental question concerns the nature of political motivation. In other words, why 
are certain people motivated to perform political actions such as voting or protesting, while other people lack such 
motivation? This question is important in several domains, including social identity theory (Hogg, 2018; Mackie et al., 
2000; Mackie & Smith, 2002; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987), relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 
1976; Davies, 1962; Folger, 1986; Gurr, 1970; Runciman, 1966; Smith & Pettigrew, 2015; Stouffer et al., 1949), research 
on collective action (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970; Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 2013; Olson, 1965; Van Zomeren et 
al., 2008), and research on the psychology of morality and justice (Deutsch, 1975; Doris, 2010; Haidt, 2007; Tyler, 2003). 
Building on insights offered by this literature, the paper proposes a general theory of political motivation that relies 
on mathematical modelling. Such mathematical outlook is novel in political psychology, yet it can potentially offer 
important insights and spark new research lines (Fried, 2020; Rollwage et al., 2019; Zmigrod, 2020). This relies on 
describing key processes underlying a phenomenon using simple mathematical modelling (Fried, 2020; Rollwage et al., 
2019; Zmigrod, 2020). Though, by reducing a phenomenon to mathematics, this perspective requires simplifications 
(examined in the discussion), the advantage is that key processes can be defined formally and clearly, thus facilitating 
theoretical debate and identification of empirical predictions.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section will describe the model, which is referred to as a Computational 
model of political motivation (CMPM). Reference effects (which are ubiquitous in cognition; e.g., Helson, 1948; Parducci, 
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1965; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) will be highlighted as a key feature of the model; these will be examined in the 
third section. The fourth and fifth sections will consider implications for previous theories and for potential empirical 
research, respectively. Finally, the paper will conclude with a discussion of the model regarding more general issues.
The Model
Contemporary mathematical models of motivation (Glimcher & Fehr, 2013; Newell et al., 2015) are built upon three 
fundamental assumptions. These assumptions are also the basis for the CMPM and are illustrated here. Shared by 
virtually all mathematical models of motivation, the first assumption maintains that the brain constantly generates 
representations of salient states of affair such as being at the cinema, being at work, or being stung by a wasp (Glimcher 
& Fehr, 2013; Newell et al., 2015; Schacter et al., 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). Representations can describe 
previous, current, future, or even fictive, states of affair (Schacter et al., 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). To each 
representation the brain is assumed to assign an incentive value (mathematically represented by a real number) which 
is at the root of motivation (Glimcher & Fehr, 2013; Newell et al., 2015). For example, the brain will assign a positive 
value to being at the cinema and a negative value to being stung by a wasp. The CMPM extends this idea to the political 
domain by postulating that, in some circumstances, the brain not only generates representations about personal states 
of affair, but also about society (a similar perspective has been advocated by research on group-based self-regulation 
and on utopia; Fernando et al., 2018; Sassenberg & Woltin, 2008). In other words, the CMPM assumes that the brain 
entertains representations describing different forms of society, for example describing a society in the past, present, 
and future, or describing fictive societies (i.e., such as in utopian representations). These not only describe how history 
is conceived (i.e., how society has changed and may change in the future), but they may include virtual realities, for 
example describing how society could have developed in different conditions, or describing societies with no link to 
history (as in utopias). In keeping with mathematical models of motivation (Glimcher & Fehr, 2013; Newell et al., 2015), 
the CMPM assumes that an incentive value (represented mathematically by a real number) is attached to each of these 
representations of society. Such incentive value can integrate both costs and benefits associated with a society, and it 
can integrate both self-interest aspects (e.g., what is good for me) as well as ethical aspects (e.g., what is just).
The second assumption (influential in mathematical models of motivation; e.g., Helson, 1948; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Louie et al., 2013; Louie & Glimcher, 2017; Parducci, 1965; Rigoli, 2019; Stewart et al., 2006) is that the incentive 
value attached to a representation is not absolute but reference-dependent. As an illustrative example of reference-de­
pendency in evaluation processes outside the political domain, consider an individual who, right before closing a deal 
for buying a flat, discovers that the price of the flat is £10 more than expected. Compare this with a case of a person 
who, before buying a coffee, is asked to pay £10 more than predicted. Apparently, an objectively equivalent extra-cost 
is experienced by both individuals. However, many would agree that the second person will be more upset. Examples 
like this describe how referent-dependency works. The CMPM extends this notion to the political domain. For this, 
the CMPM relies on an influential model of reference effects during decision-making (Rigoli, 2019) (note that different 
models are currently competing to explain reference effects (e.g., Louie et al., 2013; Louie & Glimcher, 2017; Rigoli, 
2019; Stewart et al., 2006); however, most accounts agree on the general principles, and hence the arguments proposed 
here would remain substantially equivalent if a different model was adopted). Following this framework, the CMPM 
defines the whole set of representations of society evoked in a given condition as the context; ultimately, this affects the 
subjective value associated with each representation (see below). Each representation of society Sk is associated with a 
raw value R(Sk) (mathematically described by a real number), which is attributed without considering the context. The 
model proposes that R(Sk) is considered to calculate V (Sk), corresponding to the subjective value associated with Sk:




Where µ and σ are the average and SD, respectively, across the raw values of all representations of society considered. 
Because f logistic corresponds to a logistic function, Equation 1 can also be formulated as:
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V (Sk) = 11 + e− R(Sk) − µσ
(2)
Note that Equation 1 and 2 imply 0 ≤ V (Sk) ≤ 1. This formulation proposes that the subjective value associated with 
any representation of society is not absolute, but reference-dependent. To understand what this means, consider a set 
of representations of society described by different levels of GDP. The raw value R(Sk) can be interpreted as the actual 
GDP of the society Sk, while the subjective value V (Sk) can be understood as its value relative to the other societies 
considered. It is such subjective value which, according to the CMPM, is ultimately at the root of political motivation 
(see below). Two forms of reference effects ensue from Equation 1 and 2 (Figure 1). First, an effect exerted by the 
contextual average µ is implemented (Figure 1a), because the average is subtracted from R(Sk). This implies that, when 
the contextual average is higher, V (Sk) will be smaller. Specifically, V (Sk) > 0.5 occurs when R(Sk) > µ, while V (Sk) < 0.5
occurs when R(Sk) < µ. Second, the SD of the contextual distribution σ is also influential (Figure 1b). When the SD is 
smaller, the distance in subjective value between two different representations will be magnified, so that the subjective 
value of one representation will be more far apart from the subjective value of another representation.
Figure 1
Relationship Between Raw and Subjective Value According to the CMPM for Different Parameters of the Model
Note. (a) Predicted effect of average µ (σ = 20). (b) Predicted effect of SD σ (µ = 35).
The third CMPM assumption concerns how the motivation for performing a political action is eventually calculated. 
Influential mathematical models in cognitive psychology propose that the motivation for performing any action depends 
on the expected consequence of that action in comparison with the outcome expected without performing that action 
(Dayan, 2012; Maier & Seligman, 1976; Rigoli et al., 2016a; Seligman, 1974). Again, this idea emphasises the comparative 
nature of cognition. As an illustrative example, consider a kid’s motivation for going to buy a chocolate bar. This 
motivation is proposed to depend not only on the expected consequence of the action, but also on the expected 
consequence of not performing the action. For example, if the kid expects her grandparents to go to buy a chocolate 
bar anyway, performing versus not performing the action does not make much difference, and the motivation for action 
performance will be low. The CMPM captures this intuition by proposing that, although the set of representations 
of society (the context) might vary considerably, in all cases three fundamental representations of society are always 
considered. First, society is described as it is believed to be at the present time (Spres). Second, a possible society of the 
future is represented as emerging if people (or a certain group of people) performed an appropriate political action 
which is thought to create positive consequences (Sact). For instance, society is represented as emerging after people 
supported a certain good party, or activated to prevent global warming, or joined a certain good protest movement, or 
after people expelled immigrants etc. Note this is a subjective representation of a future society which is evaluated as 
being positive, and which is thought to be conditional on performing an appropriate political action. Third, a possible 
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society of the future is represented as emerging if people (or a certain group of people) did not perform an appropriate 
political action (SNoact). For instance, society is represented as emerging after people have not supported a certain good 
party, or have not activated to prevent global warming, or have not joined a certain good protest movement, or after 
people have not expelled immigrants etc. Like any other representation of society conceived, Spres, Sact and SNoact are 
associated with raw values R(Spres), R Sact  and R(SNoact), respectively (note that by definition R(SNoact) < R(Sact)). These 
can be considered together with Equation 1 to compute the subjective values, namely V (Spres), V Sact  and V (SNoact), 
respectively (Figure 2) (note that V (SNoact) < V (Sact)). Following influential mathematical theories of motivation (Dayan, 
2012; Maier & Seligman, 1976; Rigoli et al., 2016a; Seligman, 1974), our model proposes that, based on V (SNoact) and 
V (Sact), a Motivation for Political Action (MPA) is derived (Figure 2):
MPA = V Sact − V SNoact (3)
The CMPM proposes that such MPA corresponds to the actual drive to perform the political action viewed as appro­
priate. Mathematically, this formulation requires that 0 ≤ MPA ≤ 1. Note that, because both V Sact  and V SNoact  are 
estimated based on Equation 1 where reference effects are implemented, MPA is also the product of such effects. Hence 
the CMPM proposes a reference-dependent nature for political motivation, because MPA does not capture how much 
performing an appropriate political action is valuable in absolute terms, but in the context of other representations of 
society. Below, we will see when reference effects have important implications for MPA.
Figure 2
Graph Describing the Subjective Value Associated With the Fundamental Representations of Society Within a Context (V (Spres), V Sact  and V (SNoact)), as 
Estimated by the CMPM
Note. The ensuing motivation for political action (MPA) is also reported. t0 corresponds to the present time, while tf  corresponds to 
the future.
In addition to determining MPA, the CMPM postulates that V Sact  and V SNoact  are also central in determining the 
ensuing political mood (Figure 3). For this aspect, V (Spres) is also relevant. The political mood can be conceived as the 
affective state associated with specific values of V Sact , V SNoact , and V (Spres). The idea that mood derives from beliefs 
about important states of affairs is classical in cognitive psychology (Lazarus, 1982; Lazarus & Smith, 1988). Here we 
formalise this notion in mathematical terms and apply this to the political domain, suggesting that political mood is 
the consequence of entertaining certain beliefs about society. Based on the different combinations of values for V Sact , 
V SNoact , and V (Spres) (with high and low values corresponding to >.5 and <.5, respectively; namely corresponding to 
raw values higher and lower than the contextual average µ, respectively), the CMPM identifies six main categories of 
political mood (note that cases where V Sact  < V SNoact  are not considered because V Sact  > V SNoact  by definition). 
When V (Spres) and V (Sact )  are both high and V (SNoact ) is low, political anxiety would emerge (Figure 3a). In other words, 
political anxiety would arise when someone believes that the current society is good, but that a substantial threat is 
looming which can be avoided through political action. For example, this mood characterises ideologies which praise 
the existent society, view it as threatened by immigration, and believe that with an appropriate response (such as 
expelling immigrants) such threat can be avoided. When V (Sact )  is high and both V (SNoact ) and V Spres  are low, the 
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CMPM proposes that political anger arises (Figure 3b). In other words, this mood would emerge when someone believes 
that the current society is bad but can largely improve with political action, though society is expected to remain bad 
without that action. For example, this mood would be expressed by movements who believe the current system is unjust 
but can be changed by their activism (though the system is expected to remain bad if they do not act). Note that the 
CMPM assumes that the difference between political anxiety and anger is that the former emerges when one believes 
that the current society is good, while the latter emerges when the current society is appraised as bad. Note also that 
both these political moods imply large MPA, because they are associated with V (Sact )  and V (SNoact) which are far apart. 
In other words, individuals experiencing political anxiety or anger would believe that political action can really make a 
difference.
Figure 3
Description of the Different Political Moods as Proposed by the CMPM
Note. Each graph describes the subjective value associated with the fundamental representations of society within an ideology 
(V (Spres), V Sact  and V (SNoact)), as estimated by the CMPM. The ensuing motivation for political action (MPA) is also reported. t0
corresponds to the present time, while tf  corresponds to the future.
A third mood identified by the CMPM is political depression (Figure 3c). This occurs when V (Spres), V Sact , and V SNoact
are all low. In other words, an ideology inducing this mood would view not only the current society but also the future 
society as bad, and this independent of any political action. As a fourth mood, the CMPM proposes political desperation 
as arising when V (Spres) is high and both V Sact  and V SNoact  are low (Figure 3d). In other words, this mood would 
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arise when, though the present is viewed as positive, the future is predicted as being gloomy, and this independent 
of any political action. When V (Spres) is low and both V (Sact) and V SNoact  are high, the CMPM assumes that political 
hope emerges (Figure 3e). This would arise when, though the present is evaluated as negative, the future is predicted 
to improve substantially even if no political action is taken. Finally, political serenity is proposed as the mood emerging 
when V Spres , V (Sact), and V (SNoact) are all high, in other words when the current society is believed to be good and 
to remain good in the future even if no political action is taken (Figure 3f). Note that political depression, desperation, 
hope and serenity all arise when MPA is small (i.e., when V (Sact), and V (SNoact) are close), in other words when political 
behaviour is thought to poorly affect society.
In short, we propose a model of political motivation which focuses on the role of different representations of society. 
The model proposes that the way these representations are evaluated is reference-dependent, in other words it is affec­
ted by the context (corresponding to all other representations of society evoked). Ultimately, these reference-dependent 
evaluations determine the motivation for performing a political action and the ensuing political mood. In the next 
section, we examine cases when reference-dependent processes proposed by the CMPM come into play.
Reference Effects in Political Motivation
In addition to the fundamental representations introduced above (Spres, Sact,  and SNoact), a variety of representations of 
society (each associated with a raw value) can be evoked in a given situation, including representations that are:
• historical, namely descriptions of society as it was in the past;
• fictive, namely descriptions thought to be impossible to apply to real life (such as utopias and dystopias);
• anthropological, namely descriptions of (past or present) society of another culture which are thought to be impossible 
to apply to the own society;
• counterfactual, namely representations of how society could be or could have been if different conditions applied, for 
instance if a different political action was taken.
The CMPM postulates that any representation of society will affect the subjective value attributed to all other repre­
sentations according to Equation 1. The impact is twofold. First, a representation associated with high raw value 
will increase the contextual average µ, hence (other things being equal) diminishing the subjective value of other 
representations. Second, a representation of society will also affect the contextual SD σ. When the SD diminishes, the 
distance in subjective value of two representations will tend to increase. Below, we examine cases when, according to 
the CMPM, the context (namely the set of representations of society evoked) is predicted to elicit reference effects that 
impact on political motivation.
Perfect Society
First, consider contexts including a representation of a perfect society. The latter is often described as a state where 
all individuals occupy their right role, conflict is resolved, and happiness and satisfaction are ubiquitous. Sometimes, 
such perfect society corresponds to a golden age, namely to a past era which is now lost forever (as for instance 
in ancient Greek or Arcadian myths). Other times, such as in some religion traditions, a perfect society is projected 
to an eschatological future. Finally, a perfect society might be conceived as a possibility affordable through political 
action (as for instance in communist ideologies; see below). To examine the role of a perfect society within the 
CMPM, let us first examine a context where no perfect society is evoked (Figure 4a) and which is characterised by the 
following vector of raw values (each associated with one representation of society): R(Sx) = 60, R(Sy) = 30, R(Sz) = 40, 
R(Sact) = 60, R(SNoact) = 30, R(Spres) = 40. The numbers used in these examples are arbitrary: as long as certain constrains 
are respected, different numbers will produce results that are qualitatively similar. In this case, the important constrain 
is that all raw values are relatively close to one another; we will see that this does not apply when a perfect society is 
evoked (see below). Applying Equation 1, we obtain V (Sact) = 0.748, V (SNoact) = 0.252, V (Spres) = 0.590, and MPA = 0.496. 
This can be described as a condition of political anxiety, because both V (Sact) and V (Spres) are high and V (SNoact) is low. 
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Now let us focus on a context where a perfect society corresponds to a lost golden age, for example where Sx describes 
a perfect society. How does the CMPM characterise this? The answer is that a perfect society will be associated with 
a raw value which is an outlier described by a high number (again, the specific number is not important here, as long 
as it is a positive outlier). For example, this can be modelled by assigning R(Sx) = 600 rather than R(Sx) = 60. Applying 
Equation 1 to the new vector, we now obtain V (Sact) = 0.419, V (SNoact) = 0.387, V (Spres) = 0.408, and MPA = 0.032 (Figure 
4b). This describes a condition of political depression, because V (Sact), V (Spres) and V (SNoact) are all low. The reason 
why, after including a golden age, V (Sact) and V (Spres) decrease is because the contextual average µ increases. However, 
inclusion of a perfect society also increases the SD σ. This leads V (SNoact) to approach 0.5, hence increasing from 0.252 
to 0.387. Consequently, the MPA also decreases. In sum, according to the CMPM, contexts where a perfect society is 
conceived as a lost golden age will tend to elicit political depression. Importantly, this prediction is the consequence 
of the specific reference effects proposed by the CMPM. For example, these reference effects explain why the MPA is 
now small (MPA = 0.032), while in the previous scenario (equivalent except for the absence of a golden age – i.e., where 
R(Sx) = 60) it was large (MPA = 0.496).
Figure 4
Examples of Application of the CMPM in the Case of Contexts Including a Perfect Society (Except for (a), Where no Perfect Society Is Represented)
Note. For each example, the vector of raw values is reported above. Each graph describes the subjective value associated with the 
fundamental representations of society within a context (V (Spres), V Sact  and V (SNoact)), as estimated by the CMPM. The ensuing 
motivation for political action (MPA) is also reported. t0 corresponds to the present time, while tf  corresponds to the future.
Let us now consider a context where a perfect society is framed in eschatological terms and is projected to the future. 
The CMPM captures this by treating both R(Sact) and R(SNoact) as outliers. This is because, in an eschatological perspec­
tive, the perfect society will materialize independent of any political action. This is reflected in the vector R(Sx) = 60, 
R(Sy) = 30, R(Sz) = 40, R(Sact) = 600, R(SNoact) = 580, R(Spres) = 40. Applying Equation 1, one obtains V (Sact) = 0.790, 
V (SNoact) = 0.778, V (Spres) = 0.348, and MPA = 0.012 (Figure 4c). This reflects a condition of political hope, where both 
V (Sact) and V (SNoact) are high, and both V (Spres) and MPA are low. As a third example, let us analyse a context 
where a perfect society is conceived as a future possibility affordable by politics. We can represent this adopting 
the vector R(Sx) = 60, R(Sy) = 30, R(Sz) = 40, R(Sact) = 600, R(SNoact) = 30, R(Spres) = 40. Note that now R(Sact) = 600, but 
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R(SNoact) = 30. In other words, a perfect society is expected to materialise only if an appropriate political action is taken. 
Applying Equation 1, we obtain V (Sact) = 0.885, V (SNoact) = 0.387, V (Spres) = 0.408, and MPA = 0.498 (Figure 4d). This can 
be described as a condition of political anger, because V (Spres) and V (SNoact) are low, but V (Sact) and MPA are high. Finally, 
there are contexts where a perfect society might be located in the past as a golden age and believed to be reproducible 
in the future by performing an appropriate action. For instance, this context is associated to the fascist ideology, which 
viewed the Roman empire as a golden age which could be revived by Italian imperialism. This condition is modelled by 
the vector R(Sx) = 600, R(Sy) = 30, R(Sz) = 40, R(Sact) = 600, R(SNoact) = 30, R(Spres) = 40. Applying Equation 1, we obtain 
V (Sact) = 0.784, V (SNoact) = 0.338, V (Spres) = 0.354, and MPA = 0.446 (Figure 5a). This context elicits a state of political 
anger which is analogous to contexts where a golden age is absent and a future perfect society is conditional on political 
action.
Figure 5
Examples of Application of the CMPM in the Case of Contexts Including a Catastrophic Society (Except for (a), Where a Perfect Society Is Represented)
Note. For each example, the vector of raw values is reported above. Each graph describes the subjective value associated with the 
fundamental representations of society within a context (V (Spres), V Sact  and V (SNoact)), as estimated by the CMPM. The ensuing 
motivation for political action (MPA) is also reported. t0 corresponds to the present time, while tf  corresponds to the future.
Catastrophic Society
Another case where reference effects are critical is when a catastrophic society is evoked, often depicted as a state 
of pervasive injustice, disorder and suffering. Let us first consider cases where a catastrophic society is located in the 
past. For example, some early modern philosophers (e.g., Hobbes, 1642/1998) thought that humanity had moved from 
a natural condition of abuse and injustice (a form of catastrophic society) to a civilized condition where substantial 
improvement was ensured by law and social institutions. The way CMPM treats a catastrophic society is similar to 
the treatment of a perfect society, but with opposite sign. In other words, within CMPM, the raw value assigned 
to a catastrophic society corresponds to an outlier associated with a low number (again, the specific number is not 
important here, as long as it is a negative outlier). An example of a context locating a catastrophic society Sx in the past 
can be described by the vector R(Sx) = − 600, R(Sy) = 30, R(Sz) = 40, R(Sact) = 60, R(SNoact) = 30, R(Spres) = 40. Applying 
Equation 1, we obtain V (Sact) = 0.619, V (SNoact) = 0.591, V (Spres) = 0.601, and MPA = 0.027 (Figure 5b). This corresponds 
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to a mood of political serenity, because V (Spres), V (SNoact) and V (Sact) are all high, and MPA is low. Consider now a 
context where a catastrophic society is expected in the future independent of any political action, as for instance in 
some apocalyptic religions. The CMPM describes this assigning R(Sact) = − 580 and R(SNoact) = − 600, hence resulting 
in the vector R(Sx) = 60, R(Sy) = 30, R(Sz) = 40, R(Sact) = − 580, R(SNoact) = − 600, R(Spres) = 40. Applying Equation 1, 
we obtain V (Sact) = 0.221, V (SNoact) = 0.211, V (Spres) = 0.654, and MPA = 0.010 (Figure 5c). This describes a condition of 
political desperation, because V (Sact) and V (SNoact) are both low, V (Spres) is high, and MPA is low. As a third case, consider 
contexts where a catastrophic society represents a threat which can be avoided through political action. For example, 
some parties view immigration as a potential disaster which can be avoided by expelling all irregular immigrants. The 
CMPM describes this assigning a very low raw value to SNoact only, for example setting R(SNoact) = − 600. This results in 
the vector R(Sx) = 60, R(Sy) = 30, R(Sz) = 40, R(Sact) = 60, R(SNoact) = − 600, R(Spres) = 40. Applying Equation 1, we obtain 
V (Sact) = 0.613, V (SNoact) = 0.115, V (Spres) = 0.595, and MPA = 0.498 (Figure 5d), which corresponds to a mood of political 
anxiety.
Beliefs About Historic Change
The CMPM is also relevant when examining beliefs about historic change. With this regard, some political views con­
ceive historic change as progress (i.e., as a steady movement towards better societies) and other views conceive historic 
change as decadence (i.e., as a steady movement towards worse societies). To examine how the CMPM distinguishes 
these two conditions, consider two contexts both associated with R(Sact) = 65, R(SNoact) = 35, R(Spres) = 50. However, the 
first context is characterised by R(Sx,1) = 10, R(Sy ,1) = 20, R(Sz,1) = 30, in other words it conceives historic change as 
progress, while the second context is characterised by R(Sx,2) = 90, R(Sy ,2) = 80, R(Sz,2) = 70, in other words it conceives 
historic change as decadence. Note that, comparing the two contexts, the contextual average µ changes, while the 
contextual SD σ remains equal. Applying Equation 1 to the first context, we obtain V (Sact) = 0.792, V (SNoact) = 0.566, 
V (Spres) = 0.690, MPA = 0.226 (Figure 6a). Applying Equation 1 to the second context, we obtain V (Sact) = 0.434, 
V (SNoact) = 0.208, V (Spres) = 0.310, MPA = 0.226 (Figure 6a). The difference is that all subjective values will be higher 
for the context associated with progress compared to the context associated with decadence. This reflects the effect of 
contextual average µ, which varies across the two different contexts. Note that the distance between subjective values 
does not vary (and in fact MPA does not very either), because the contextual SD σ remains unchanged across contexts. 
In summary, reference effects postulated by CMPM predict that, when compared to views believing in decadence, views 
believing in progress will perceive the present and future society as better in subjective terms.
Figure 6
(a) Examples of Application of the CMPM in the Case of Contexts Where History Is Viewed as Progress or Where History Is Viewed as Decadence (See 
Main Text for the Vectors of Raw Values). (b) Application of the CMPM to the Communist Manifesto
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Note. The actual manifesto is compared with an imaginary version where only V (Spres), V Sact  and V (SNoact) are included as 
representations (see main text for vectors of raw values). For both (a) and (b), the graph describes the subjective value associated with 
the fundamental representations of society within a context (V (Spres), V Sact  and V (SNoact)), as estimated by the CMPM. The ensuing 
motivation for political action (MPA) is also reported. t0 corresponds to the present time, while tf  corresponds to the future.
In short, the CMPM implicates that the motivational and affective aspects of political beliefs are influenced by reference 
effects which depend on the whole set of representations of society evoked. Here we have examined how reference 
effects unfold depending on how historical change is appraised, and on whether a perfect or catastrophic society is con­
ceived. Our analysis has focused on historical representations of society, although often other types of representations 
(fictive, anthropological, counterfactual) are also evoked. The CMPM proposes that similar processes will be at play also 
in these cases. The next section will examine how the model can be connected to previous theoretical research with an 
interest in political motivation.
Implications for Theoretical Research
The CMPM is relevant for a variety of research lines with an interest in political motivation, including social identity 
theory (Hogg, 2018; Mackie et al., 2000; Mackie & Smith, 2002; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987), 
relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976; Davies, 1962; Folger, 1986; Gurr, 1970; Runciman, 1966; Smith & Pettigrew, 
2015; Stouffer et al., 1949), research on collective action (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970; Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 
2013; Olson, 1965; Van Zomeren et al., 2008), and research on the psychology of morality and justice (Deutsch, 1975; 
Doris, 2010; Haidt, 2007; Tyler, 2003). The CMPM offers a novel mathematical perspective that can potentially help in 
re-casting aspects of these theories in a formal fashion. Here we will discuss the CMPM in the context of this research. 
Because this literature is vast, the focus will be only on some of the most relevant contributions for the CMPM.
Social identity theory analyses the processes whereby individuals identify with groups and develop in-group and 
out-group attitudes (Hogg, 2018; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). Within this research tradition, 
Intergroup emotions theory (Mackie et al., 2000; Mackie & Smith, 2002) integrates social identity theory and models 
of emotion. According to this, when group identity is salient, a social event generates a cognitive appraisal which in 
turn elicits an appropriate emotional response and motivational tendency. The notion that a cognitive appraisal is at 
the root of emotion and motivation is shared by the CMPM; in the latter, the cognitive appraisal is casted as a set of 
evaluations attributed to different representations of society, from which mood and motivation arise. The CMPM can 
be conceived as an extension of Intergroup emotions theory (Mackie et al., 2000; Mackie & Smith, 2002) in as much as 
(i) it extends the focus from intergroup dynamics to the political domain (by proposing that representations of society 
and their associated values are key players in this domain), (ii) it emphasises reference effects which are not considered 
by Intergroup emotions theory, and (iii) it offers a formal mathematical treatment of key concepts (absent in Intergroup 
emotions theory) such as political motivation.
The CMPM embraces the notion of referent cognition, which guides theories in a variety of psychological domains 
(e.g., Helson, 1948; Parducci, 1965; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Hence, the CMPM has analogies with theories in 
political and social psychology which rely on referent cognition. These theories include the relative deprivation model, 
which considers subjective evaluations as comparative in nature (Crosby, 1976; Davies, 1962; Folger, 1986; Runciman, 
1966; Smith & Pettigrew, 2015; Stouffer et al., 1949). In this perspective, an important distinction is between self-related 
deprivation (Crosby, 1976; Runciman, 1966), which compares the self against other individuals (or against the self in 
the past), and group-related deprivation, which compares in-group versus out-group conditions (Pettigrew et al., 2008; 
Runciman, 1966). The latter type of relative deprivation is closer to ideas proposed by the CMPM, where the focus 
is on the political domain and hence more on groups rather than single individuals. Inspired by relative deprivation, 
another proposal (Folger, 1986) has emphasised that comparisons do not always involve objective references (such as 
other people or past conditions), but they can be based on fictive references (such as counterfactual scenarios). This 
idea is shared by the CMPM, where representations of imaginary societies can be at play. The CMPM can be conceived 
as an extension of relative deprivation theory and similar accounts in as much as (i) it extends the analysis beyond 
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intergroup comparison (which is the focus of relative deprivation theory and similar accounts), encompassing political 
scenarios where intergroup comparison is not involved (by focusing on representations of society rather than on group 
comparisons), (ii) it proposes a sophisticated taxonomy of political mood (relative deprivation theory has rarely explored 
this besides frustration and anger; Crosby, 1976), (iii) it explores further the role of reference effects (by following 
recent literature on this subject; Louie et al., 2013; Louie & Glimcher, 2017; Rigoli, 2019; Stewart et al., 2006), and (iii) 
it offers a revised view of motivation which takes into account not only the level of deprivation but also how effective 
a political action is expected to be. The latter point is particularly important: according to most relative deprivation 
accounts, motivation depends only on how relatively deprived individuals feel (the higher the deprivation, the higher 
the motivation). However, empirical evidence has shown that this is insufficient for explaining motivation, and that 
aspects such as perception of action efficacy are also critical (Corcoran et al., 2011; Dalton et al., 2010; Oberschall, 1973; 
Van Zomeren et al., 2004). The CMPM formalizes the concept of perception of action efficacy as corresponding to the 
MPA (namely, the difference in value between performing and not performing the action).
The CMPM is also relevant for research on collective action, especially regarding the question of why people partic­
ipate in social movements. Early accounts (some based on relative deprivation) proposed grievances as the key factor 
underlying the motivation to support social movements (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970; Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 
2013). Based on evidence showing that aggrieved people often do not participate in social movements, mobilization 
theories (Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 2013; Oberschall, 1973; Olson, 1965; Van Zomeren et al., 2008) argue 
that perception of political efficacy (e.g., about political skills and resources) is also critical (an arguments supported 
empirically; Corcoran et al., 2011; Dalton et al., 2010; Oberschall, 1973; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). Furthermore, recent 
scholars emphasise that beliefs about grievances and efficacy are not objective but subjective in nature (Klandermans 
& van Stekelenburg, 2013; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). The CMPM fits with theories that, for explaining the motivation 
to participate in social movements, rely on the notion of grievances and efficacy, and conceive these as subjective 
constructs. Within the CMPM grievances can be described by the subjective values attributed to the different represen­
tations of society, while efficacy is formalized as the very concept of political motivation. By implementing referent 
evaluation, the CMPM proposes that both grievances and efficacy are subjective, namely they ultimately depend on the 
context (which is defined by the representations evoked in each situation). The CMPM can be conceived as an extension 
of theories of collective action in as much as (i) it offers a formal mathematical treatment of key concepts and their 
relation (absent in previous models of collective action), for example offering a formal description of action efficacy 
(interpreted as MPA), (ii) it proposes a link between beliefs and mood, and (iii) it explores the role of reference effects 
further (by following recent literature on this subject; Louie et al., 2013; Louie & Glimcher, 2017; Rigoli, 2019; Stewart et 
al., 2006).
Finally, the CMPM is relevant for research in the psychology of morality and justice (Deutsch, 1975; Doris, 2010; 
Haidt, 2007; Tyler, 2003). In this area, an important question is how judgements about morality and justice motivate 
behaviour. The CMPM addresses this question in the political domain. According to the CMPM, the incentive value 
attached to each representation of society integrates two aspects. First, it depends on self-interest considerations. 
Second, it also considers judgements about what is morally right or just. For example, the personal GDP might influence 
the self-interest component, while the Gini index (reflecting wealth inequalities among people) might affect the ethical 
component; the resulting value attached to a representation of society integrates both (with some people weighting 
more the self-interest versus the ethical component, and vice versa for other people). The CMPM offers a mathematical 
description of the processes through which self-interest and ethical evaluations ultimately motivate political action (note 
that the model does not focus on why certain societies are judged as morally right or just, but on the effects of these 
judgements upon political motivation).
In short, the CMPM can contribute to theoretical research in several areas within political psychology. In general, 
the model helps re-casting aspects of previous theories in mathematical terms. This approach is useful for at least two 
reasons. First, it allows to express the concepts in a more formal and clear way. Second, this approach helps integrating 
different research areas because it shows that apparently different ideas can often be reduced to the same formal 
concept. Below, we will now turn to assessing the CMPM in the context of empirical research.
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One central aim of the CMPM is to inspire empirical research. To this aim, we propose two broad lines of investigation. 
First, some fundamental assumptions of the theory need to be validated empirically. For example, it remains to be 
established to what extent representations of future societies (i.e, Sact and SNoact) impact on political motivation and 
(together with Spres) mood (at least for people who care about politics). Also, it remains to be assessed empirically wheth­
er reference effects implicated by the CMPM are at play in political thinking. With this regard, models similar to the 
CMPM have been investigated in the context of value-based decision making and have received substantial empirical 
support (Louie et al., 2013; Louie & Glimcher, 2017; Rigoli, 2019; Rigoli et al., 2016b; Stewart, Reimers, & Harris, 2015). 
In particular, evidence highlights both an effect exerted by the contextual mean and SD during decision-making (Rigoli 
et al., 2016a). However, whether similar reference effects can be identified also when investigating the political domain 
remains an open question. For addressing this, experimental research could examine whether participants’ evaluation of 
society and political motivation (e.g., manifested as willingness to engage in political actions) change after manipulating 
descriptions of society.
A second line of research consists in applying the CMPM to predict individuals’ political motivation. The CMPM 
assumes that representations of society, their raw and subjective value, motivation for political action and political mood 
are psychological constructs (i.e., they are at play in the “mind” of an individual) that can be measured indirectly, for 
example with questionnaires. To measure these variables, participants could be asked to evaluate society at different 
moments in history and to predict future society. Data could then be interpreted to infer the psychological constructs 
postulated by the CMPM and henceforth to predict participants’ will to engage in political behaviour in the future 
(e.g., voting or protesting). In addition to such observational studies, we suggest that the CMPM can also be applied 
to interpret political speeches or political writings such as political manifestos. Although this approach allows only a 
qualitative description, an important advantage is that it permits applying the CMPM also to past political thinking.
To illustrate how the CMPM can be applied to political writings, here we propose an interpretation of the Commu­
nist manifesto (one of the most influential political writings in history; Marx & Engels, 1848/2002) based on the CMPM. 
The first step is to identify the different representations of society depicted in the writing. Western capitalistic society 
of the mid-19th century, the time when the manifesto was published, is analysed in detail. The key aspect of that society 
is the conflict between the bourgeoisie, a class viewed as dominant, and the proletariat, a class viewed as exploited. 
According to the communist manifesto, class conflict is not only the key process driving contemporary society, but also 
human history in general. This concept is adopted also to describe the Middle Ages, where the conflict is identified 
among feudal lords, town-people, and serfs. While mid-19th century capitalistic and Middle Ages societies are discussed 
in depth, ancient Roman society is only mentioned briefly (for example in the first page), yet it is still interpreted 
with the lenses of class conflict (in this case, among patricians, plebeians, and slaves). Noteworthy, the first page of 
a later edition of the manifesto reports a note which focuses on pre-historic society. This is described as a primitive 
communist organization where individuals are not divided in classes (and hence class conflict is absent) and ownership 
is shared. In addition to focusing on the present and past, the manifesto offers a detailed description of the future society 
predicted to emerge as consequence of proletarian straggle. The manifesto predicts first a dictatorship of the proletariat, 
in which this social class takes control over the state and the economy, followed by a communist society where state and 
social class vanish and “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all” (Marx & Engels, 
1848/2002). In summary, the manifesto offers a description of society during pre-history, ancient Rome, Middle Ages, 
mid-19th century capitalism, and during the future communist era.
Adopting the perspective offered by the CMPM, we can interpret the representation of the mid-19th century 
capitalism society as Spres, and we can label representation of past societies in the pre-history, ancient Rome, and Middle 
Ages as Spre ℎist, SRome, Smid age, respectively. Regarding the future communist era, this can be interpreted as the society 
expected to occur if an appropriate political action is taken (Sact). This captures the notion that a communist society 
can be realised, but only if the proletariat keeps fighting the bourgeoisie. Note that the manifesto never describes a 
political scenario which would occur if the proletariat did not engage in class struggle. This might be because the 
manifesto appears to assume that proletarians have the power and the interest to defeat the bourgeoisie, and hence 
that they will surely engage in appropriate class straggle. In a CMPM perspective, because SNoact is never described 
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explicitly, it needs to be inferred indirectly. Here, we assume that the manifesto implicitly assumes that society would 
remain like mid-19th century capitalism if proletarians did not engage in class straggle, hence we set SNoact = Spres. Once 
different representations of society are identified, the CMPM requires us to infer the raw value associated with each. 
We acknowledge that an inference based on political writings such as the Communist manifesto risks to be highly 
subjective. However, we argue that a qualitative picture can often be identified. From reading the manifesto, it is 
evident that the raw value attributed to Spre ℎist, SRome, Smid age, and Spres, SNoact is similar (remember that SNoact = Spres). 
For example, comparing Smid age and Spres, sometimes the manifesto seems to implicate that the former is morally better. 
We can read that “In one word, for exploitation, vailed by religion and political illusions, it [the bourgeoisie] has 
substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation” (Marx & Engels, 1848/2002). Other times, the manifesto seems 
to suggest the opposite, when it writes that “[the bourgeoisie] has been the first to show what man’s activity can 
bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals” 
(Marx & Engels, 1848/2002). Moreover, the appraisal of Spre ℎist is unclear, because this representation is never evaluated 
explicitly. On the one hand, Spre ℎist is associated with lack of civilization (which is usually considered as negative 
in the manifesto). On the other, it is characterised by primitive communism and lack of class exploitation. Overall, 
these considerations suggest that the manifesto evaluates roughly equally all representations except Sact. Hence, we 
can assign the same raw value to all representations except Sact, and set R Spre ℎist  = R SRome  = R Smid age  = R Spres  = 
R SNoact = 40 (again, the specific number is not important here, as long as these representations have equal raw value). 
Conversely, the manifesto emphasises the uniqueness of future communist society. This is viewed as economic and 
technological development combined with lack of class exploitation, a condition predicted to allow true individual and 
social fulfilment. In the perspective of the CMPM, this fits with a description of a perfect society which can be described 
by setting R Sact = 600  (again, the specific number is not important here, as long as it is a positive outlier).
Once the raw values are inferred, we can apply Equation 1 to estimate subjective values, obtaining V (Sact) = 0.885, 
V (SNoact) = 0.399, V (Spres) = 0.399, and MPA = 0.486  (Figure 6b). This captures a mood of political anger, because 
V (SNoact)  and V (Spres)   are both low, while V (Sact) and MPA are both high. In other words, the present is viewed as 
gloomy but political action is believed to be able to realise an enormous improvement. We can now consider the CMPM 
to ask another interesting question. What is the psychological effect of including a description of past societies in the 
manifesto? To answer this, let us imagine an alternative version of the manifesto with similar descriptions of Spres, Sact, 
and SNoact, but without any reference to Spre ℎist, SRome, Smid age. This alternative version would be characterised by R Spres  = 
R SNoact = 40 and by R Sact = 600. Applying Equation 1, we now obtain V (Sact) = 0.760, V (SNoact) = 0.360, V (Spres) = 0.360,
and MPA = 0.401 (Figure 6b). Comparing this imaginary manifesto with the original one, the subjective value of Sact, 
Spres and SNoact all decrease. This is because the contextual average µ of the original manifesto is lower. In addition, the 
contextual SD σ of the original manifesto is smaller, implying that the distance among representations increases. A 
consequence is that the MPA is larger in the original, compared to our imaginary, manifesto. In other words, applying 
the CMPM allows us to predict that including a description of past societies which are as negative as the present society 
has the effect of boosting the motivation for political action. This is a specific prediction of the CMPM which remains to 
be empirically investigated.
In short, here we have described how the CMPM can inspire empirical research relying on experimental, observatio­
nal, and textual investigation. We have discussed an example of the latter by focusing on the Communist manifesto. 
Though textual analysis is more exposed to subjectivity, nevertheless we argue that the CMPM can be fruitfully applied 
to characterise interesting qualitative aspects, as the example discussed here suggests.
Discussion
A recent perspective advocates the adoption of mathematical modelling as a powerful tool to deepen our knowledge in 
political psychology (Fried, 2020; Rollwage et al., 2019; Zmigrod, 2020). This perspective emphasizes how computational 
modelling can help characterising political attitude and behaviour as manifested empirically. Building on this, here 
we argue that, in addition to supporting empirical research, mathematical modelling can also contribute to theoretical 
research in political psychology. This paper offers an example of a novel theory, grounded on simple mathematical 
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modelling, about one of the central concepts in political psychology, namely the concept of political motivation. The 
model proposes that the subjective value of different representations of society is calculated in a reference-dependent 
manner and plays a key role in determining the motivation to act politically and the ensuing political mood evoked.
Our goal was to offer a simple and clear model of political motivation. This has required simplifications that might 
be revised in the future. First, the current version of the CMPM includes only two representations of the future (Sact and 
SNoact). This is clearly a simplification, because multiple future temporal points can be conceived (e.g., the Communist 
manifesto distinguishes between socialist and communist society; Marx & Engels, 1848/2002), multiple political actions 
can be considered (each potentially leading to a different future society), and because each action could potentially 
lead to multiple outcomes, each with some probability. Second, the CMPM currently does not consider the role of 
uncertainty. Each representation of society might be linked with some level of uncertainty. For example, there might 
be uncertainty about how a society worked in the past, or about how the society works now or will work in the 
future. Also, there might be uncertainty about the outcome of different political actions. Finally, uncertainty could 
be represented at different hierarchical levels (higher level uncertainty, such as about outcome probability, is often 
referred to as volatility; e.g., Behrens et al., 2007). Third, the CMPM assumes that each representation within the context 
exerts the same impact on reference effects. This might be oversimplistic. For example, it might be that the farther a 
representation in time, the lesser its impact on reference effects. These are all aspects currently not contemplated by the 
CMPM, but which deserve careful theoretical and empirical consideration by future research.
To summarise, here we propose a new perspective for interpreting political motivation, based on a simple mathemat­
ical model of referent cognition. We argue that the model can offer valuable insight and can integrate a more classical 
approach to the study of political motivation (Crosby, 1976; Davies, 1962; Deutsch, 1975; Doris, 2010; Folger, 1986; 
Gurr, 1970; Haidt, 2007; Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 2013; Olson, 1965; Mackie et al., 2000; Mackie & Smith, 
2002; Runciman, 1966; Smith & Pettigrew, 2015; Stouffer et al., 1949; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 
1987; Tyler, 2003; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). The model can potentially inspire theoretical and empirical investigation, 
encompassing experimental and observational studies as well as textual analysis.
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